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TARGETING INTERGOVERNMENTAL AID TO 
LOCAL SCHOOLS: AN ANALYSIS OF FEDERAL 
AND STATE EFFORTS 
JOHN P. PELISSERO, Loyola University Chicago 
and 
DAVID R. MORGAN, University oj Oklahoma 
Students of public policy have long been interested in redistribu-tion. Especially in a political system permitting some degree of decentralization, the question often becomes which level of gov-
ernment should assist the poor (Ladd and Doolittle 1982). Economic 
theory favors the national government, with its broader geographic 
scope and more progressive tax system. Yet many argue that the states 
are closer to local problems and thus best suited to reallocate financial 
resources. Although a growing body of research has begun to address 
this issue (see, for example, Dye and Hurley 1978; Rafter 1985; Stephens 
and Olson 1981; Ward 1981), very little appears comparing the rela-
tive targeting effectiveness of the national government and the states in 
the area of aid to local public schools. The purpose here is to help fill 
this research gap by comparing state and federal targeting of 
intergovernmental assistance to a large number of local school districts 
across the United States. 
We begin by considering the theoretical issues surrounding redis-
tribution or targeting.! Then we briefly review some of the empirical 
findings that compare federal and state targeting. The analysis pro-
ceeds in several stages. First, we examine the extent to which 
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1 Strictly speaking, redistribution and targeting are not synonymous, although they 
obviously are closely related. Redistribution requires a Robin Hood effect; tar-
geting, on the other hand, says nothing about the source of the funds that are to 
be allocated on the basis of need. In effect, targeting is a necessary but not suf-
ficient condition for redistribution. Yet, we think the two terms are similar enough 
to justify using them synonymously. 
986 The Western Political Quarterly 
intergovernmental aid is enrollment-driven. Second, we examine the 
results of an analysis of enrollment influences in individual states. The 
findings from this exercise lead to the final step, an examination of the 
concentration on socioeconomic and fiscal needs in a subset of better-
targeting states. 
FEDERAL VERSUS STATE TARGETING OF GRANTS·IN·AID 
The issue of who should help needy local schools might be seen as 
part of a larger debate over the appropriate division of responsibilities 
within the U.S. federal system. According to considerable economic 
and political theory, the national government is better positioned to 
pursue redistributive policies than state and local governments. Pre-
sumably, the central government, with its inclusive geographic scope, 
can undertake redistributive policies with less risk than can state or 
local jurisdictions (see Oates 1972: ch. 1). Localities have special dif-
ficulties in dealing with economic and social conditions that sprawl 
across jurisdictional boundaries. So Peterson (1981: 68-71) urges local 
governments to eschew redistributive efforts and instead to adopt pol-
icies that will enhance the economic base and productive potential of 
the community. Otherwise, the permeability of local government bound-
aries and mobility of capital leaves these units unduly vulnerable to 
loss of mobile citizenry who generally belong to the revenue-producing 
segment of the population (David and Kantor 1983: 293). The central 
government thus inherits the responsibility for redistribution almost 
by default. 
Despite the theoretical argument for federal targeting, other liter-
ature offers two notable reasons why the national government may do 
poorly at redistribution. First is what Downs (1980: 530) calls the "law 
of political dispersion." In a democratic system based on single-member 
districts, politicians must spread the benefits of public policy to con-
struct and maintain governing coalitions and to ensure reelection. The 
compulsion to disperse benefits widely, often referred to as universal-
ism, tends to make all jurisdictions eligible for grant programs, reduc-
ing if not eliminating any potential for targeting. Second, Congress's 
commitment to a wide dispersal of benefits has been facilitated, at 
least until recently, by the absence of effective budgetary constraints 
(Stein and Hamm 1987). 
Research on the targeting of federal funds yields a mixed picture. 
Despite the theoretical rationale for redistribution, most federal grants 
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are driven by population not local need (Copeland and Meier 1984). 
There are exceptions, of course. Project grants leave some discretion 
in the hands of federal administrators, which may allow concentration 
offunds on needy people or needy areas (Anagnoson 1980: 235). And, 
certain substantive programs seem more amenable to targeting than 
others. The now defunct Urban Development Action Grants did a rel-
atively good job of targeting funds on the most distressed communities 
(Rich 1982). Studies by the U.S. General Accounting Office (1990) 
also show that federal revenue sharing reduced local fiscal disparities 
more than did state aid programs. Under certain conditions, then, 
federal programs may achieve some modest degree of targeting. 
In the field of public education, where its financial support has 
been minimal, the federal government has been able to offer funding 
packages with fairly limited purposes. Thus a number of federal cate-
gorical grants have been aimed at special groups. Of these, the largest 
has been Chapter I (formerly Title 1) of the Elementary and Second-
ary Education Act of 1965, which funds compensatory education for 
children from low-income families (Tsang and Levin 1983: 352). 
Timpane (1978: 2) estimated that about 56 percent of federal expen-
ditures for elementary and secondary schools for 1976 were for pro-
grams targeted to disadvantaged groups. But, a number of federal 
formula-based education grants do not target on the basis of social, 
economic, or fiscal hardship, e.g., grants for vocational and technical 
training and for educating the handicapped. So federal aid to educa-
tion is not purely redistributive either by intent or practice. 
What does research show regarding targeting by the states? Per-
haps state policymakers, being closer to local problems, may be more 
responsive to local needs. Warren (1981: 31) also suggests that com-
munities within a given state are more homogeneous than localities 
scattered across the nation, thus making it easier for state policymak-
ers to design need-based formulas to guide aid allocation decisions. 
Some studies do show that states target their aid to local governments 
and may do so more effectively than the federal government (Dye and 
Hurley 1978; Stephens and Olson 1981). For example, pooled analy-
ses of the states have shown them to provide somewhat greater aid to 
cities with more social, economic, or fiscal need (Pelissero 1984, 1985; 
Stein 1981). But perhaps education is different. Even though state 
school formulas are closely tied to district enrollments, states have a 
long history of attempts to increase targeting to districts of special 
need. Still, states have a long history of attempts to reduce inequities 
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in school funding. The results have been mixed, even though during 
the 1970s, 28 states modified their funding formulas to weaken the 
traditional nexus between dollars and pupils and to provide more 
money for the disadvantaged (Fuhrman 1982). So some states appar-
ently do respond to school district need (Morgan and Pelissero 1989; 
Pelissero and Morgan 1987). Most of the research on state aid, how-
ever, does not offer separate analyses within individual states (an excep-
tion is Stein and Hamm 1987). Thus, the degree of targeting observed 
on the part of all states might be largely the result of the redistributive 
actions of just a few. 
A final qualification: we must acknowledge that some federal or 
state programs may be more likely than others to reach districts with 
special requirements. But with an analysis of all districts in all states, 
it is not possible to disaggregate aid totals. 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
Based on the above theory, our research expectations are as 
follows: 
1. Enrollment will be the main determinant of both state and fed-
eral aid to independent school districts but will be an especially pow-
erful force for states. 
2. Federal aid per pupil will be better targeted to disadvantaged 
districts than will state aid. 
3. State targeting will be a feature of aid systems in only a small 
number of states. 
The analysis includes virtually the universe of U.S. independent 
school districts. Forty-five states have independent school districts; the 
parent government provides nearly all local school support in Hawaii, 
while Alaska, Maryland, North Carolina, and Virginia have no inde-
pendent school districts (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1983: 17). Also, 
the analysis will exclude Rhode Island, with only three independent 
school districts. The final number of districts included in the study 
was 13,655 (higher education districts were excluded). We chose the 
period 1982 because of the availability of a Census of Governments 
report in that year and its close proximity to the collection of targeting 
indicators during the 1980 census. The 1982 data also provide the 
opportunity to examine the effects of state targeting that were an 
expected consequence of the educational finance reforms put in place 
by a number of states during the 1970s. 
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The dependent variables for our study are federal aid (aggregate and 
per pupil) and state aid (aggregate and per pupil) to independent 
school districts in 1982.2 These data are from the 1982 Census of 
Governments. 3 The choices for independent variables are modeled after the 
Stein and Hamm (1987) study of the universe of U.S. municipal gov-
ernments. We first employ enrollment itself as a variable in an aggre-
gate analysis of both federal and state aid in 1982. This allows us to 
examine initially the linkage between total intergovernmental aid from 
the federal or state governments and the number of pupils in the sys-
tems. The indicators of targeting are drawn from the 1980 census (by 
school district) and the Census of Governments. Three measures of need 
tap different aspects of socioeconomic problems in the school districts. 
Like Stein and Hamm (1987), we will use a district's per capita income 
as a predictor of aid. But we have added two key social targeting mea-
sures to the analysis: the proportion of the school district that is black 
and the percentage of indigent families with children in the school 
district. 4 The two remaining targeting measures are indicators of the 
independent school districts' fiscal health. A fiscal effort measure has 
been constructed by taking a school district's total revenue from own 
sources (exclusive of tuition and fees) and dividing it by enrollment. 
The second fiscal variable taps the debt burden of the school district. 
We operationalize debt as the amount of annual debt interest divided 
by enrollment, or debt (interest) per pupil for each school district. If 
targeting occurs, we expect federal or state aid per pupil to be posi-
tively related to the proportion of black and poor families in the dis-
trict and to the size of the debt burden. Further, we expect well-
targeted systems to show a negative relationship between aid and both 
per capita income and revenue per pupil. 
FINDINGS 
We consider the effects of federal aid first. Table 1 presents two 
models of federal aid to over 13,000 independent school districts for 
2 Some nominally state funds actually represent federal pass-through aid. The Advi-
sory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (1980: 9) reports that net federal 
assistance (including pass-through) is about 17 percent of total intergovernmental 
aid to local education (for 1977). The national government directly supplies less 
than 2 percent of local school funding (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1990: 7). The 
data available for this research include only direct federal aid. 
3 These data were provided by Robert M. Stein, Rice University. 
4 Data on each of these socioeconomic measures are drawn from the 1980 Census, by 
school district, as reported by the National Center for Education Statistics. 
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fiscal year 1982. The first equation, column 1, shows how much dis-
trict enrollment alone affects total dollars of federal aid. Enrollment 
has a very strong and significant impact on federal aid, reflected in the 
beta of .62. In this equation, 38 percent of total federal aid can be 
explained by enrollment alone. In a subsequent model (not shown) we 
included the other need variables in the equation but they contributed 
virtually nothing to explained variance, as the adjusted R 2 remained 
at .38. Because the need measures do not register in this ~ssessment of 
total aid, it might be useful to transform the dependent variable. The 
aid literature reveals some disagreement over this issue, however. The 
most common appro~ch is to use per capita figures, primarily to avoid 
what Dye and Hurley (1981) call the "so what" effect, that large juris-
dictions receive the most money. Several studies take a different view, 
that an analysis using per capita figures may produce misleading results 
(Ward 1981), or that decision makers are more likely to think of total 
dollars rather than in per capita terms (Anton, Cawley, and Kramer, 
1980: 104). The position one takes depends primarily on what the 
researcher wishes to show. We elect to use per pupil measures in most 
of this analysis because the results, especially with the state aid equa-
tions, are more interpretable and intuitively pleasing. We should note, 
however, that enrollment was tried as a predictor of federal per pupil 
aid but could account for none of the variation in this measure and is 
not used in the analysis shown in column 2 of Table 1.5 
Column 2 offers a model of federal aid per pupil that includes the 
key measures of socioeconomic and fiscal need. 6 Again, we expect that 
federal aid per pupil will be positively related to the proportion of 
blacks and poor children and size of district debt, and negatively 
related to per capita income and district own source revenues. This 
model of federal aid per pupil is quite weak, however. Only two pre-
dictors are significant and in the expected direction. Specifically, fed-
eral aid is very modestly targeted to school districts with larger pro-
portions of children from poverty families (beta = .11) and lower per 
5 We also examined a model of total federal (and, in a later analysis, state) aid using 
aggregate need measures, but the level of intercorrelation between predictors was 
too high to use these as a comparison to the per pupil results reported here. 
6 It may be worth noting that the simple correlations between total enrollment and the 
social need measures were: total number of blacks in district, r = .82, total 
number of poor families with children, r = .92. The multicollinearity between 
these measures and enrollment was another reason not to include enrollment in 
the equation. 
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TABLE 1 
FEDERAL AND STATE AID TO INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICTS, ALTERNATIVE 
REGRESSION MODELS, 1982 
Dependent Variable Models 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Total Federal Total State 
Federal Aid State Aid 
Predictors Aid Per Pupil Aid Per Pupil 
Enrollment .62** .97** 
(30.14) (1,860) 
Black % -.04** .02* 
(-64.81) (764.19) 
Poor Children % .11** .00 
(603.81) (26.39) 
Income Per Cap -.06*' -.07** 
( -.00) ( -.16) 
Own Revenue/Pupil .00 .33*' 
(.00) (.41 ) 
Debt Int./Pupil .00 .02 
(.01) (.66) 
!!Itercept -26,697 33.30 -1,022,343 1736.37 
R2 
.38 .02 .93 .11 
N 13,654 13,655 13,654 13,652 
'p ~ .05 *'p ~ .01 
(Figures in parentheses are unstandardized regression coefficients) 
capita incomes (beta = -.06). Own source revenue and debt have no 
impact in this model, while the proportion of blacks in the district has 
a weak and inverse relationship to targeted aid. Overall, only 2 per-
cent of the variation in per pupil federal aid is explained with this 
model. 
N ext we consider the models of state aid. Table 1 also shows the 
equations predicting state transfer payments using enrollment and the 
selected indicators of district need. If one looks first at the total dollars 
of state aid (column 3), the immense power of enrollment alone is 
obvious. Enrollment has a beta value of .97 and this model shows that 
enrollment accounts for 93 percent of the variation in total state aid in 
1982. So in the aggregate, 93 percent of all state funds for public 
schools across the country can be accounted for by enrollment alone. 
Again, the need variables can add nothing to explaining total state 
aid. We also checked to see if total school population can account for 
variation in state dollars per pupil and found that it does not. This 
992 The rtfstern Political Quarterly 
nonrelationship suggests the possibility that some targeting might be 
going on. The final model in column 4 tests that assumption. Indeed, 
school districts with higher proportions of black residents and lower 
per capita incomes receive more state funds per pupil. But this evi-
dence of targeting is offset by some nontargeting relationships. Higher 
own source revenues per pupil is a significant determinant of per pupil 
aid, contrary to our expectation. Overall, the pooled analysis model 
accounts for 11 percent of the variation in state aid per pupil. 
Questions could be raised about the analysis being sensitive to the 
effects of a few very large or very small school districts in the data set. 
Hypothetically, a fe}V outliers could skew the results. To check this 
possibility, we divided the districts into four enrollment groups and 
used model three (Table 1) to determine if state targeting might vary 
by district size. In general, the pooled analysis shows that targeting is 
better in larger districts. 7 
As suggested above, some state educational funding systems may 
be much less enrollment-driven than others. If so, a pooled analysis 
may be subject to the effects produced by just a few good or poor 
targeting states. To investigate this possibility, we performed separate 
regressions for each state, treating the school districts of each state as 
part of a system with its own unique distribution characteristics. We 
initially assessed the linkage between a state's total aid to schools and 
district enrollment for the 44 states delineated above. The regression 
results showed that in 28 of the 44 states, total aid was allocated nearly 
exclusively on the basis of enrollment. In these states8 nearly all state 
education funding (98 to 99 percent) was based on enrollment. Another 
six states (KS, MI, NM, NY, OH, SD) allocated 90 to 97 percent of 
aid on that basis. School aid in the remaining 10 states (CT, ME, 
MA, MO, MT, NH, Nj, TN, VT, WY), many found in the North-
east, was somewhat less predicted by enrollment alone (70 to 89 per-
7 The model accounts for just 12 percent of variance for districts of less than 1,000 
students but reaches 32 percent for the largest jurisdictions. In three larger 
enrollment groups (1,000-4,999,5,000-9,999,10,000 + students) proper target-
ing is apparent to districts with lower own source funds, higher proportions of 
children from poor families, and higher debt burdens per pupil. The relative size 
of the black population in these districts has little or no effect in the models. And 
the smallest schools (less than 1,000) reflect only one weak targeted relationship 
(income). Regression models for federal aid per pupil with the five predictors 
across the four enrollment categories generally showed little difference. 
S The states included AL, AZ, AR, CA, CO, DE, FL, GA, ID, IL, IN, lA, KY, LA, 
MS, NE, NV, NM, ND, OK, OR, PA, SC, TX, UT, WA, WV, WI. 
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cent). The 16 states that do not allocate aid exclusively on the basis of 
district enrollment are worth more detailed study. 
As the final step, we conduct a within state analysis for the 16 
"better" targeting states, using per pupil aid as the dependent variable. 
The results of this exercise appear in Table 2. The multiple regression 
equations reveal that among these states, a few represent good fits to 
our model. The explained variance ranges from a low of 0 percent for 
Tennessee to a high of 98 percent in Montana. (The Montana results 
are almost exclusively attributable to one non targeted predictor, own 
source revenue, and as such it is clearly a deviant case). Perhaps more 
important than the, overall predictive capacity of the model is the vari-
ability among the states in their response to need variables. 
None of the states react to all five indicators of need. Maine and 
New York are the most responsive states, with significant targeting 
relationships for four of the five predictors. In each of these states, the 
only nonsignificant predictor is proportion of poor children, although 
it is in the targeted direction. Excluding Montana, we find that Maine 
and New York stand out as the best targeting states with explained 
variances of 45 and 49 percent, respectively. Four states - Michigan, 
Missouri, New Jersey, and Ohio - respond to three indicators of need. 
Each is somewhat special in its targeting predictors, although the range 
of explained variance is similar (21 to 37 percent). Four more - Kansas, 
Massachusetts, Montana, and Vermont - concentrate on just two mea-
sures of need. Minnesota, New Hampshire, South Dakota, and Wyo-
ming show significant targeting relationships with one need indicator, 
while Connecticut and Tennessee target none of our measures. And 
what of socioeconomic versus fiscal targeting by these states? While 10 
states respond significantly to socioeconomic indicators (i.e., blacks, 
poor children, income), 11 states target fiscal need (i.e., lower reve-
nues, higher debt). We might note, though, that unlike the case for the 
social or economic measures, several of the significant fiscal variables 
are in the wrong direction (for own revenue - Minnesota, Montana; 
for debt - South Dakota). 9 Only five states target to greater minority 
population; four of these have sizable black populations. And only four 
states provide proportionately more funding to districts with higher 
9 In these two anomalous states, Minnesota and Montana, districts that raise larger 
sums of money on their own are rewarded with more state funding. This arrange-
ment bears a resemblance to the funding formula for the now defunct federal 
General Revenue Sharing program, which included tax effort as one of its three 
equally-weighted components. 
\D 
TABLE 2 
\D 
..,. 
REGRESSION MODELS FOR STATE AID PER PUPIL TO INDEPENDENT SCHOOL 
DISTRICTS FOR 16 BETTER TARGETING STATES, 1982A ~ 
'" 
Percent Pct Poor PerCap Own Revenue Debt Interest ~ 
"i 
State R2 Black Children Income Per Pupil Per Pupil Intercept ~ ;:0 
Connect. .30 .13 .64 .09 .28 -.20 ~ ;::.. 
(4310.13) (12126.08) (.01 ) (.08) (-.26) -72.15 [ 
Kansas .64 -.03 -.03 -.08 -.80** .16* * ~ ( -464.22) (-1053.05) ( -.04) ( -.33) (.97) 2108.83 
... 
Maine .45 .24* .12 -.27* -.36** . 23** ~ .. .... 
(76871.64) (3544.25) (-.14) ( -.29) (.83) 2010.75 ~ 
Mass. .06 .13 .13 .33 -.42' .32' 
(6772.31 ) (7069.54) (.09) (-.23) (2.21 ) 786.79 
Michigan .35 .24" .07 -.04 -.51*' .07* 
(1166.31) (1815.00) (-.01 ) (-.24) (.37) 1057.72 
Minnesota .28 -.02 .05 -.05 .44*' .20** 
(-4953.90) (2745.98) ( -.04) (.76) (2.24) 1391. 92 
Missouri .21 -.03 .09* -.29** -.16" -.08 
( -140.97) (1506.44) ( -.08) ( -.09) (-.70) 1704.89 
Montana .98 .01 -.02 -.03** .95*' .04* 
(31550.13) (-2510.05) (-.21) (.47) (1.50) 1344.06 
New Hamp. .04 -.03 .17* -.17 .06 .06 
(-680.51) (1723.65) ( -.02) .01 .07 319.52 
New Jersey .37 .20** .27'* -.36*' .24" -.04 
(1352.75) (12394.00) ( -.09) (.09) (-.24) 1333.95 
New York .49 " .07.06 ,* -.30* * -.49* * .21 
(477.85) (2115.70) ( -.06) (-.11)" (1.102300.02 
Ohio .21 ** .19" .14-.07 *' -.31.03 
) (736.77) (3202.50) (-.01) (- .12) (.191146.70 
S. Dakota .37 -.06 .11 " -.45'* .32" -.17 
) ( -2698.84) (1081.55) (- .16) (.18) (-1.491629.77 
Tenn. .00 .16 -.23 -.41 .15 -.03 
) (289.44) (-1897.17) ( -.08) (.10) (-.161224.50 
Vermont .07 -.00 .01 '* -.22' -.13.06 
) (-529.19) (348.44) (-.10) (-.04) (.331318.54 
Wyoming .45 .05 .23 -.17 '* -.58-.07 
) (12290.62) (15065.63) (-.20) (-.41) (-.434268.28 
, p ::5 .05 
"p ::5 .01 
aStandardized coefficients shown on first line for each state; unstandardized regression coefficients are displayed in parentheses on the second line. 
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percentages of poor families with children. In sum, better targeting 
than expected is found among these 16 states, but more effort goes to 
meet the needs of economically or fiscally strapped districts than to 
those with greater social need. But in general we confirm our expecta-
tion that the apparent targeting of school aid among all states is sub-
stantially affected by the actions of a handful of better targeting systems. 
CONCLUSION 
This research shows that federal and state total dollar allocations 
to public schools ar~ prominently affected by enrollments, especially 
state aid. When intergovernmental school allocations are converted to 
per capita amounts, however, the effect of enrollment vanishes. Still, 
the analysis shows that neither government engages in much targeting 
to the social, economic, or fiscal needs of recipient districts. What then 
are we to make of the various theories about how political systems 
allocate aid dollars? One prominent position in the economics litera-
ture suggests that if any redistribution is to occur in a decentralized 
political system, it must come from the central government. Yet, con-
trary to our expectations, we found little evidence of federal targeting 
of school funds. With the data available, we are unable to offer any 
reasonable explanation for the allocation of the federal education dollar. 
Another well-accepted theoretical perspective indicates that little tar-
geting of intergovernmental aid is likely because the "law of political 
dispersion" compels lawmakers to spread funds as widely as possible. 
This research cannot definitively confirm either of these differing 
viewpoints regarding how aid is allocated. For education grants, espe-
cially those from the state, enrollment remains the dominant factor in 
allocation formulas. Is this sufficient to accept the argument that most 
school aid is driven by universalistic allocation practices? We think the 
answer is yes. Aggregate data preclude a knowledge of decision-maker 
motives. But when dollars closely track people, universalism seems the 
most plausible explanation. Yet, when we examined state aid more 
closely by considering individual states separately, a somewhat differ-
ent picture appeared. Some 16 states did seem to direct some of their 
school aid to needy districts. 
What makes these states good targeters? Could it be that they have 
crafted educational funding systems emphasizing equalization? Not 
necessarily. In 1982, seven of these states funded most basic school 
programs through an equalization formula. But the other nine states 
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used a foundation or general aid appropriation for the bulk of public 
school assistance. Interviews with state school finance officials in six of 
the best targeting states (from Table 2),10 revealed that in most cases 
considerable targeting was intended by the states' distribution formu-
las. For example, Maine considers a school district's fiscal capacity in 
its foundation program formula and awards aid inversely to districts' 
real property values. Maine also subsidizes debt service - one of the 
few states to consider a local district's ability to pay debt. Michigan's 
formula provides that most state aid is to be distributed inversely to 
local revenue effort and property wealth. Districts with high mileage 
rates and low proptlrty values will receive more funding. Missouri is 
one of the few states to target aid to needy children rather than needy 
districts. Although its formula tends to reward wealthy districts with 
larger numbers of children, the distribution system does require an 
additional appropriation of state aid for each AFDC child in a district. 
Until 1990 reforms, New Jersey used an equalization program designed 
to award more money to schools with lower equalized property values. 
New York's system is pulled by the demands of the New York City 
schools, but 60 percent of state operating aid is distributed inversely to 
district wealth. Among our top six targeters, only Ohio appears to be 
passive in providing more aid to needier schools. The state's formula is 
designed to give more aid to larger, urban districts. Therefore, it is 
likely that the states' targeting effectiveness is an artifact of larger dis-
tricts, which clearly have more needy children and less wealthy prop-
erty values, receiving most of the aid from state government. 
The interview data essentially confirm the statistical results. The 
better targeting states are those with a legal plan to distribute more 
money to needier school districts or to districts with larger numbers of 
needy children. Perhaps other states could examine the distribution 
system in Maine or Michigan or even New York and find effective 
strategies for enhanced targeting capacity. Although such schemes may 
not always be popular politically, a few states are setting an example 
of good targeting both for other states and for the national government 
in the area of public school assistance. 
10 State school finance or school administration officials in Maine, Michigan, Mis-
souri, New York, New Jersey, and Ohio were interviewed by telephone in July 
1991. Reports from several of these states were also examined to understand a 
state's distribution system. 
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TABLE 2 
REGRESSION MODELS FOR STATE AID PER PUPIL TO INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICTS 
FOR 16 BETTER TARGETING STATES, 1982a 
Percent Percent Poor PerCap Own Revenue Debt Interest 
State R2 Black Children Income Per Pupil Per Pupil Intercept 
Connect. .30 .13 .64 .09 .28 -.20 
(431013) (1212608) (01) {08) (-26) -72.15 
Kansas .64 -03 -03 -08 -.80** .16* * 
(-46422) (-105305) (-04) ( -.33) (97) 2108.83 
Maine 45 .24* .12 -.27* -.36* * .23** 
(7687164) (354425) (-14) (-29) (83) 2010.75 
Mass. .06 .13 .13 .33 -42* .32* 
(6772.31) (706954) (09) (-23) (221) 786.79 
Michigan .35 .24** .07 -.04 -.51 * * .07* 
0166.31) (81500) (-01) (-.24 ) (37) 1057.72 
Minnesota .28 -02 .05 -.05 44** .20** 
(-495390) (274598) (-04) (76) (224) 1391.92 
Missouri .21 -03 .09* -.29** -.16** -.08 
(-14097) (50644) (-08) (-09) (-70) 1704.89 
Montana .98 .01 -02 -.03* * .95** .04* 
(3155013) (-251005) (-21) (47) 0.50) 134406 
New Hamp. .04 -03 .17* -.17 .06 .06 
( -680.51) (72365) (-02) .01 .07 319.52 
New Jersey .37 .20** .27* * -.36* * .24** -.04 
(35275) (239400) (-09) (09) (-24) 1333.95 
New York 
Ohio 
So. Dakota 
Tenn. 
Vermont 
Wyoming 
*p ::; .05 
**p ::; .01 
.19 
.21 
.37 
00 
.07 
.15 
.07** .06 
(47785) (211570) 
19** .14* * 
(73677) (320250) 
-06 .11 
(-269884) (108155) 
.16 -.23 
(289.14 ) (-189717) 
-.00 .01 
(-52919) (34844) 
.05 .23 
(1229062 (1506563) 
-.30* * -.19* * .21 * * 
(-06) (-11) (110) 230002 
-.07 -.31 * * .03 
(-01) (-12) (19) 1146.70 
-.15** .32** -.17* * 
(-16) (18) (-1.19) 162977 
-AI .15 -03 
(-08) (10) (-16) 1224.50 
-.22** -.13* .06 
(-10) (-04) (33) 1318.54 
-.17 -.58* * -.07 
(-20) (-.11) (-.13) 4268.28 
aStandardized coefficients shown on first line for each state; unstandardized regression coefficients are displayed in parentheses on the 
second line. 
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